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In the Suprem.e Court of the
State of Utah

OREM CITY, a ·Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.

CASE
NO. 10211

DEE PYNE,

Defendant-Respondent.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATE1~ENT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant-Respondent was charged with the· crime of
a misdemeanor in the Orem City Court for failing to pay
a license tax to Orem City for a retail sales used automobile business operated by hi·m in Orem.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

In theOrem City Court the Defendant-Respondent was
convicted and thereafter appealed his conviction to the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah in and ~or Utah
County claiming that the license ordinance was void · as
to him.
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The Defendant-Respondent being entitled to a trial
de norvo entered a plea of "not guilty", but stipulated that
during the time charged in the complaint he conducted a
retail sales used car business within Orem City and made
srues subjoot to the sales tax imposed by the State of Utah
and had not paid any Orem City license, tax.

Orem City Ordinance No. 26, passed by the City Council of Orem City May 22, 1961, and duly published in the
Orem..1Geneva Times on June 1, 1961, a newspaper of general cir.culation in Orem City, was introduced in evidence
by stipulation· of the parties. The Def-endant-Respondent
moved the· Court for dismissal of the complaint _solely on
the ground that the ordinance is invalid .in. imposing any
tax on his used car sales business on the basis that the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory in
its application to the Defendant-Respondent's business.
The Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah in and for
Utah County on date of August 3, 1964, on the grounds
that the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory ,granted the motion and entered an Order of Dismissal in accordance therewith.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant in this appeal requests. the
Court for an order reversing the lower court Order of Dismissal and de·clare Orem City Ordinance No. 26 valid and
constitutional as against the Defendant-Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Th~

is no

reco~d

of evidence other than stipulation

by the parties that the Defendant-Respondent during the
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time charged in the complaint conducted a retail sales used
automobile business within Orem City and made sales subject to the sales tax imposed- by the State of Utah and had
not paid any Orem City license tax.
0'rem City O·rdinance No. 26 was introduced in evidence by stipulation of parties; that section 3 of said ordinance imposed a license fee on the Defendant-Respondent
of one-tenth of 1% of the gross sales of Defendant-Respondent's business. The Defendant-Respondent- moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the ordinance
is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory in its application to the Defendant-Respondent's business.
APPELLANT'S POINT

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND
DISCRIMINATO'RY IN ITS APPLICATIO·N TO DE·
FE·~lDANT-RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AS GROUNDS
FOR GRANTING THE O·RDER O,F DISMISSAL.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1

THE COURT E.RRE·D IN H·OLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE WAS UNREASO·NABLE, ARBITRARY, AND
DISCRIMINATORY IN ITS APPLICATION TO DE..
FENlDIAN'I'-RE'SPO·ND·ENT'S BUSINE'SS AS GROUNDS
FOR GRANTING THE o~RDER OF DISMISSAL.
Orem City Ordinance No. 26 is the ordinanee in question held to be unreasonable, ·arbitrary, and discriminatocy.
The ordinance was enacted by the authority given to cities
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by Sectlon 10-8-~0, Utah Oode Annotated 1953, and Section 10:-8-80, ,Utah Oode Annotated 1953, to tax businesses
for revenue purposes, provided, however, as it is set forth
in Section 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated 19'53, that "all
such license fees and taxes shall be ~orm in respect to
the class upon which they are imposed.'' Orem City Ordinance No. 26 specifically states that the purpose of .the
ordinance is to raise revenue.

Section 3 of Orem City Oroinance No. 26 levies a tax
of 1/10 of l% of the gross sales of -businesses in Orem City
engag~d in sell~g tangible personal ,property· where such
sales are subject-.to Utah State sales tax, with a minimum
of $6.25 per quarter-year and a maximum of $75.00. for
the same period. The Defendant-Respondent being engag~ ,in the. sale of tangible personal--property consisting
~uSe,d- automobiles comes under Section 3 of
Orem City
. .
.
Or~ance No. 26. The -question then of whether or not
~~-:-o.~ce is unreasona:ble, arbitrary, and discrimina_Jn~ iS rto·-·be determined by the law as to unif~ity _in
respect to a class upon which a tax ·is imposed.
.

.

.

.

~

..

~·

The general rule of law as stated by our own Supreme
Court ·in the case of Slater vs. Salt Lake City, et al, 115
Urtah 476, 206 P 2d 153, is as follows:
"Discrimination is the essence of .classification
and does violence to the eonstitUtion only when the
basis upon which it is founded is unreasonable. In
fixing ·fue Umits of the class, the legislative body has
a wide -discretion and this court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy orf the law. Our function is to determine whether an enactment operates
· equally upon all persons similarly situated. If it does
then ·the discrimination is within permissible legis-
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lative li:rnits. If it does not, then the differentiation
would be without reasonable basis and the act does not
meert the test of constitutionality."
The test laid down iby this case is rthat the ordinanc'e
must opemte equally upon all persons similarly situated.
Here, the Defendant-Respondent is in the retail used automobile sales business. No question is raised as to whether
or not other retail used automobile sales businesses are
taxed on a different basis. The ordinance treats used oar
dealers all alike. This principle is illustrated by the case
orf Bradley vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33
SC p 318. The United States Court had before it an appeal in which the Plaintiff in error was convicted in a lower court for violation of an ordinance fo~bidding the carrying on of a business of a private banker without a license.
The case before the court upon the claim made in the State
Court stated the ordinance denied both the equal prortection
and due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance in question required all persons desiring to pursue certain businesses and occupations to pay
a special license tax for the privilege of prosecuting such
business. Many pursuits were named, among them real
es·tate agents, commission merchants, brokers, auctioneers,
private bankers, etc. The persons required to pay such
special license tax were divided by the Finance Committee of the City Couneil into thirteen ~classes
The Plaintiff in error, who was in the banking business, claimed that the actual operation of the ordinance
brought abourt: an unjust and illegal discrimination in that
he ha~l been classified in such a manner as to subject him
and his business to a higher tax as a condition orf issuing
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to him a lirense, than that required by that of many other
private bankers. The court said that some private bankers
were put into classes trhat subjected them to less taxation
than the class into which the Plaintiff in error was placed
is the only allegation which would tend to show discrimination, but there was evidence tending to show that rthe
business done by the Plainrtiff in error and ten other ·persons or firn1s was that of lending money at higher rates
upon salaries and household furniture, while the kind of
business done by others in the same general business was
the lending of money upon commercial securities. Obviously, the burden was upon the Plaintiff in error to show
an illegal and capricious classification.
The State Court
said fuart he had failed to show that these private bankers
favo,red in tJhe classification were doing the same business.
'Dhe court_ affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
1

In Sedalia ex rei. Bauman w. Standard Oil Company,
66 Fed. 2d 757, 95 ALR 1514, a U. S. Court decision, the
court. said: .

"The appellee claims the ordinance is unreasonable because it descriminates between those who may
sell ·gasoline and haul it in containers such as are de•
scribed in the ordinance and otheTS who haul it in
containers of less ~size, and discriminates between those
who may both sell and transport gasoline as described
in the ordinance within the city and others who may
sell it within the city, but transport it into, out of, or
through :the city ·and between those whose whole business is the sale and transportation of gasoline and others who sell other articles than gasoline."
The court noted that it did not appear that there were
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any other vendors of gasoline who transported it in any
manne,r.
The court. then said that the presumption of the validity o[ an ordinance, as in the case of other laws, may
not be overthrown by the suggestion of discriminations
that may never be proved.
The trial court had said that the ordinance was invalid
for lack of uniformity in the operation because irt omitted
to impose a similar tax upon those who sold gasoline but
did not transport it, and upon those who transported .it in
containers of less ·capacity than five gallons.
The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in answer
to this said:
"Assuming that there may have been other3 who
sold or transported this commodity under these circumstances, the requirement of unifonnity . is met if
_·the tax falls alike on _all ·PersonS who are in substantially the same situation."
The court then cited the case of City of St. Charles
vs. Schulte, 305 Mo. 124, 264 SW 654, and quoted from the
case as follows:
"The Legislature delegated rto cities orf the thiro
class, as it was competent for it to do, · authority to
levy and collect a license tax on the vendors o[ soft
drinks. Under this general power so delegarted to it
the City of St. Charles was not bound to levy the same
amount upon all vendors of soft drinks. It eoruld, in
its discretion, divide them upon any reasonable basis
into classes, as, for example, the volume of business
done (City of Aurora v. MeGannon [138 Mo. 38, 39
SW 469,] supra), or the specific eharacter of the drinks
sold (In re Watson [17 S.D. 486, 97 NW 463, 2 Ann.
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Oas. 321,] $l}pra,) and.fix a differ~t tax for each class
(1. Cooley, Tax'n 4th Ed. 353). ·upon the same principle peddlers have long been classified in this state
·for the purpose of taxation. ·- Section · 9259, · R.S. 1919
Mo. St~ Ann. 13318.

There can be no doubtbut that, under well-settled
principles, respondent was not ·bound to levy· ahd ·coi·lect a license tax-. upon vendors of- all kinds of· soft
drinks~ if it imposed a tax .upon -the vendors of .any.
It could in its discretion have imposed a tax upon those
--who engaged in selling near beers, without . imposing
-·a:ny· at· :a.n upon the vendors of other soft drhlks~ Carroll v. Wrighrt, 131 Ga. 728, -63< S.E·. ·260; Coca-Oola
--.OJ. v. Skillman, 91 Miss. 677; 44 :So. 985."
The court in the Sedalia ex rei. Bauman vs. Standard
_Oil Com~any, 66 Fed._2d,:757,-95 ALR-1514, then went
on to say:
·"On this -recoro it iS not made to-appear that there
- WaS ·not a reasonable basis for the- classification adopted. The suggestion that the classification offends also
.. a~~t the FQ!urteenth -Amendment to the Constitu-tiO!fl m the United States is .sufficiently met by what
was .said on -that subject in Campbell Baking Co. v.
City of Harrisonville, Mo. (C.C.A.) 50 F. 2nd. -670."

The- --·case ·recognizes that _-even on fu.e same type_ ,of
business, namely soft. drinks, it may -be broken down into
additional-classes and not violate the law as to equality:of
treament. ·The· cases of Hays vs. Commonwealth, 55 SW
425; State ·vs. Webber, 113 SW 1054; People vs. Smith,
110 NW 1102; In re Abel, 7·7 Pac. 621; State vs. Montgomery, 43. Atlantic 13, all sustain this view.
'Dhe· -Orem City ordinance doesn't go this far.· To compare we would say retail sales (lst class), soft: drinks (1st
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sUibelass),,,volume'of drinks sold (2nd subclass). TheOrem
ordinance~. stops at the- first class.
In . the_. case of.· Fredericksburg vs.· Sanitary Grocery
Co., .168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 AlLR 1195~ there was a
subclasSification :of grocecy stores, the effect of which was
to .:put chain .stores in a separate· class. The· defendant
raised: the .questions .of unreasonable classification· so as to
amotmt to. discrimination, and unequal protection of the
law. The .cOW't· retused··;the cont-entions of the ,Defendant and quoted from the case of McKenney vs. :City Council of Alexandria., .147-:Va. 157, 136 _SE 588 as follows: .
'"The general· rute· so far as classifi!cation of busi'ness ·for the purpose of· taxation is concerned is· that

trades,. O~GlJ.pations, professions _and . privileges may
- _he ,clas8ified for puvposes of license or. occupation :~~-- _:
·a.nd differenrt

licenses may be imposed upo!Il the vB;rl-

-

ous classes -providing·_ the clasS,ificatioo is reasonable,
-(37- C.J.- P 198, par. 52.), and .cases ·cited in headnote
24 including a number of Virginia cases, General classes may be divided· into _particular classes and;lirenSed
.. or tax€d."
·The court in -the case ·of· Fredericksburg vs. Sanitary
Grocery ·co~ 168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 ALR 1195, after stating the general rule above, stated:
"It is not ,the function of this court in cases like
,the present to consider the propriety or unjustness, of
the ,tax to seek for the motives or to criticize the public Policy which prompted the adoption of the legislation. Our duty is to sustain the ·classification adopted by the legislature if theTe are substanrtial· differences between the occupations separately classified. ,
·such differences need nOt be great. The past decisions
of the Court make this abundantly clear."
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The court in the case orf Frede~ricksburg vs. Sanitary
Grocery Co. 168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 ALR 1195, as
stated above sustained the classification of the grocery
chain store into a separate class. This case along with
the case of Bradley vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 Led. 603,
33 SOp 318 , and the case off Sedalia eoc rei. Bauman vs. Standard Oil Company, 66 Fed. 2 d 757, 95 AL.R 1514, sustain
classification and subclassification far in excess of the Orem
City ordinance. These cases clearly support the position
of Plaintiff-Appellant.
What is meant by classification or classes is well ex-·
pressed by the. case ~f .Bradley vs.. Richmond, 227. US 477,
57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, when the U.S. Court said:
"In order to render the classification illegal, the
party assailing it must show that the business dis(~~--~-------------criminated against is preeisely
the same as thart included in the class which is alleged to be favored."
(Underlining supplied)
In the case of .Bueneman vs. City of Santa Barbara,
65 Pac. 2d 785, an ordinance of the City of Santa Barbara
impo~ a license fee of $200.00 yearly on laundries maintaining distribution systems in the city without having a
plrant in the city, while laundries with plants in the city
were exempted. Th~ ordinance was held to be discriminatory. The business is laundries. Then there is a subclasSification of the busdness known as laundries. This is
the type of situation that the court in the case of Bradley
vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, had
in mind ·when it said:
"In order to render the classification illegal, the
party assailing it must show that the business dis-
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criininated against is precisely the sarne as that included in the class which is alleged to be favored."

Another case similar to the California case just cited
is that of City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grooery ~Co.~
179 SE 768, wheTe the city ordinance had a provision assessing an occupation tax on grocery stores in two classes;
one class of grocery sales on a cash-and-carry system where
all are cash sales and no deliveries outside the store; one
class of grocery store on a system of cash and credit sales
with deliveries outside the store. The court ·held the classification_ to be discriminatory.
The 118Jtwal question is why treat these two types of
grocery stores differently. It would seem here that these
two businesses are precisely the same or at least very similar. The Bradley case test. See also Park City ·vs. Daniebl, 149 Pac. 1094.
ln the three cases last cited, the courts held the OTdi~
nances to be discriminatocy, but it is to be noted that it
was in connection with a sub-classification of the same type
of business. In the case of Derst Baking Co. vs. Mayn•r
and Aldermen of City of Savannah, 179 SE 7'63, the court
said that you cannot divide a business into ·its constituent
elements, parts, or incidents and levy a separate tax on
each or any element, part, or incident thereof.
~

The Defendant-Respondent in the case now 1befo~e the
Court is treated the same by the Orem City ordinance as
all used car- businesses are treated. There is not a division of the auto business into separate parts, elements, or
incidents.
It is to' be noted rthart all the cases that come berore
the !courts are those where the two or more classes are the
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same business; laundryman vs. laundryman as to location;
soft -drinks vs. soft drinks as to volume and character; grocery vs. grocery as to cash or eredit; gasoline sales vs. gasoline sales as to transporting and location; bankers vs.
bankers as to type of security dealt with; all a particular
occupation or business that is sub-classified and subclassified. The business is precisely the same or at least very
similar. Countless decisions recognizze the sub-classification if a distinction can be found even in the same business.
w~here different unrelated businesses are the ones involved
in the alleged discrimination, rthe courts recognize and accept the classification because they are difierent types of
businesses.
Fundamentally, the Orem City ordinance has two levys
-one. at the rate of $25.00 and one at one-tenth of 1% of
the gross sales. The lower court observed that any businesses that were selling tangible, personal property at r~
tail such as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement
plant,_ creamery, photography shop, or in the sale of goods
made in Japan, Hong Kon.g, Formosa, China, or India
should be taxed on the same basis as the used car dealer
or else the ordinance was discriminatory; in other words,
the lower oouct in effect held that you could not have a
sub--classification .of retail sales businesses even though
the businesses were different kinds of businesses, and even
though the retail sales part of the business in those such as
an appliance s:hop, cement plant, and photography shop
were only a part of the business, and the ·main part of the
business involved services or processing.
The legislative body is not required to make meticulous adjustments in :an effort to avoid incidental hardships
(New York Rapid Transit Co. vs. New Yo~k, 303 US 573,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
58 S.Ct. 721). Unless the license tax is shown to be arbitrary and unfair, the courts will not interfere with 1Jhe action ill the legislative body.
The eourts generally say the tax must apply equally
to ·all members of a given class. The problem rtlhen comes
down to what is meant by a given class. We submit that
a classif~cation based on "same occupation" would fit the
court understanding of a given ·class. The problems of
nearly all the cases involve classlfication within the occupation.
This was the question which gave. the Utah Supreme
Court eoocem in the case of Slater vs. Salt Lake City et al,
115 Utah 476, 206 P2d 15-3. The Court spoke of unwarranted exemptions. The Court said to permit selle~rs of couponS· redeemable m photographs or works of art to sell
their vvares on the streets, and in the same enactment proWhit magazine sales on the streets was preferring one cla.Ss
ove ranother because it was a different item sold.
This classification gees much fartheT than the soft
drinks 1case <:.1ted in the forepart of this brief. The two
cases are quite different. It would be hard to say that the
two items sold on the street in the ease of Slater vs. Salt
L~ke Clty et al, 115 Utah 476, 206 P 2d 153, should be
treated differently. The Court was not considering a license fee case, but equality of use of the 1street. The Court
said unless there is some substantial difference in the classes, one cl~ass of merchants should not be permitted to use
the sidewalk for private gain and another -class doolied the
same right. Equality of treatment rather than dis~crim
ination should be the object of the ordinance.
In the case before the Court, Defendant-Respondent
is in the used car business. The oroinance does nort make
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classes within the used car business; all used car businesses
are treated alike. The ordrinance is even more fair in that
the Defendant-Respondent being in retail sales i~s treated
the same as orthers whose business is primarily in retail
sales. Actually as to his own case, Defendant-eRspcmdent
must want a breakdown of retail sales business into different elasses. Then we would run into what the court
had said in the case of New York Rapid Transit Co., vs.
New York, 303 US 573, 58 S. Ot. 721, cited ab<we. Namely,
the legislative body is not required to make meticulous adjustments in effort to avoid incidental hardships, and that
administrative convenience may justify classification for
the purpose of taxation.
Different retail sales 1businesses will each have ~advan
tages and disadvantages that the other doesn't have. How
to wei·gh them would be most difficult. If the legislative
body tried to do so, it would be faced with other person's
judgment as to the distinction or difference contrary to
its' judgment. To use the words of an eminent jurist-to
write a licensing ordinance that is precisely fair and equal
to eaoh taxpayer and business is probably beyond the ability of man; hypothetically if a perfect ordinance were written rtoday, the shifting economic activity of tomorrow might
cause it to be unfair. Our legislative enactments must be
more stable of construction and we must all accept in the
affairs of men the mere excellence of an approach to perfection.
There is no evidence in the record as to the nature of
the business of oriental goods, or as to what was considered wl)en the framers set oriental goods out, nor is there
any evidence that they were arbitrary or capricious. The
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U. S. Supreme Court in the case of. Bradley vs. Richmond,
227 lJS 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, pointed out that the
burden is on the one compl,aining of the classification to
show it to be illegal and capricious. On its face, oriental
goods shoWs that it is an unusual business. In a community
such as ours, the volume of business would be minor.
Query, what if Defendant-Respondent were to aTgue Indian goods are not listed, it would point out the idea of
small volume or a 'business of such small~ness as nort to
me,rit even a classification. The presumption is with the
framers of the ordinance. Our society is complex and diverse so that to frame an ordinance that treats everyone
exactly alike is impossible of aa.xmplishment.
Lastly, where a statute is susceptible of two oonstrutions,: one o[ which will render it .constitutional and the
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the Court Will
adopt the construction which, without doing vio~ence to
the· reasonable meaning of the language used, will render
it valid in its ~tirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though other construction is equally reasonalble. It is presumed that the legislative body mtended
nort to violate the constitution, but to make a valid O["dinance within the scope of its ~constitutional powers.. Every
presumption must be in favor of the constitutionality of the
ordinance passed by the legislative body, and to justify a
court in pronouncing legislation unconstitutional the ·case
must be so clear as to be free from doubt and the conflict
of the ordinance with 'the constitution must be irreconcilaJble.
In 12 American Jurisprudence, page 214, Section
521, the law :as to the constitutionality of ordinaniCes is summarized ·as follows:
.

.
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"In accordance with the basic rules of constitutional law und~lying court review of legislation assailed
as unconstitutional, in those cases in which laws are
attacked as vio~ating the equality requkements of the

Federal and State Constitutions there is a presum~
tion in favoc of a legislative classification, of th·e reasonab~eness and fairness of legislative action, and of
legitimate grounds of .distinction if any such groW1ds
exist :on which the legislature acted. Hence, when fue
classification in a law is called in question, if any reasonable state af facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state orf facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed."

.· "In the deiertnimttoo: -'of:.;·what classification is
. within the range-:ofy.QiSCretion 'and what is arbitrary,
. reg~d. must he have _to, the particular subject of action,. the characteristics. of the class as a whole must
b~ lO<lked t(), and the classifi.oation is entitled to be
te8ted ·by the conditions which uswllly and ordinarily
exist. That similar ocdinances have been adopted and
sustained in other states· is an indication that the classification is reasonable."
In the exercise of the undoubted right of classifieation, it may often happen that some classes are subjected
to regulation and some individuals are burdened with obligaftions which do nort rest on othe~ classes or other indi-

viduals not similarly situated, but this fact does not necessarily vitiate an ordinance because it would practically defeat legislation if it were laid down as an invariable rule
that an ordinance is void if it does not bring all within its
scope ·or s~bject an· to the same burdens.
Trhe legislative body is entitled to the benefit of the
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preswnption that it acted reasonaJbly. It is the burden of
the Defendant-Respondent, which he has not carried, to
prove otherwise.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully contend that the Court erred in holding that the ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary, and
discriminatory, and request the Court for an order reversing the lower court Orner of Dismissal, and declare Orem
City Ordinance No. 26 valid and constitutional as against
the Defendant-Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
H. V. WENTZ,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
6 North State
Orem, Utah
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